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NEPA AND THE ROAN PLATEAU: FORCING 
THE BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT TO 
TAKE A HARD LOOK 
William Griffin* 
Abstract: In 2007, the Bureau of Land Management adopted a resource 
management plan that essentially made all public land within the Roan 
Plateau Planning Area available for leasing to private oil and gas entities. 
Environmental groups alleged that the BLM, in adopting the plan, failed 
to satisfy the National Environmental Policy Act’s procedural require-
ments. In Colorado Environmental Coalition v. Salazar, the district court held 
that the BLM violated NEPA by failing to adequately consider the plan’s 
cumulative air quality effects. On remand, the court did not offer the 
agency any instructions in curing the procedural deficiency. The court’s 
lack of guidance on remand is consistent with the Tenth Circuit’s refusal 
to equate NEPA’s procedural requirements with the production of hard 
data. This Comment argues that the Ninth Circuit’s application of NEPA 
better promotes the Act’s underlying policies of public awareness and in-
formed decisionmaking without imposing an undue burden on federal 
agencies. 
Introduction 
 Visit the Roan Plateau in Garfield County, Colorado, and you will 
encounter a diverse wildlife population that includes mountain lions, 
sage grouse, peregrine falcons, and a species of cutthroat trout that has 
remained genetically pure since the most recent ice age.1 The hydro-
carbon-rich soils of the Roan Plateau produce a variety of rare plant 
species, some of which cannot be found anywhere else in the world.2 
Paradoxically, the biological and geological characteristics that account 
for the Roan Plateau’s natural beauty have also incentivized humanity’s 
 
* Staff Writer, Boston College Environmental Affairs Law Review, 2012–2013. 
1 Colo. Envtl. Coal. v. Salazar, 875 F. Supp. 2d 1233, 1239 (D. Colo. 2012); Sean Patrick 
Farrell, Defending the Not-Quite-Wild, N.Y. Times, Oct. 30, 2009, at B1; Anthony Licata, An Over-
view of the Roan Plateau, Field & Stream ( July 20, 2010), http://fieldandstream.com/blogs/ 
finding-deer-hunt/2010/07/overview-roan-plateau; Roan Plateau, LANDSCOPE AMERICA, http:// 
www.landscope.org/colorado/places/Roan%20Plateau (last visited Apr. 22, 2013). 
2 Roan Plateau, supra note 1. 
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degradation of the environment.3 In particular, tension exists between 
preserving an unsullied landscape and extracting the nine trillion cubic 
feet of recoverable natural gas beneath the Roan Plateau.4 The natural 
resources of the Roan Plateau represent up to $1.13 billion in leasing 
revenue for Colorado and the federal government.5 Furthermore, en-
ergy industry experts project that within the next twenty years, an addi-
tional ten thousand to twenty thousand oil wells will be drilled in the 
area—more wells than in Saudi Arabia and Iran combined.6 
 A significant portion of the drilling will occur on publicly owned 
land as a result of an amended Resource Management Plan (“RMP”) 
that the Bureau of Land Management (“BLM”) promulgated in 2006.7 
The amended RMP was a response to an act of Congress mandating 
that the BLM make publicly owned lands within the Roan Plateau 
available to private entities for petroleum exploration and develop-
ment.8 Prior to the BLM’s amendment to the RMP, approximately sixty 
percent of the Roan Plateau Planning Area remained unavailable for 
oil and gas development.9 The amended RMP made the entire Plan-
ning Area available for leasing.10 
 In 2012, in Colorado Environmental Coalition v. Salazar the U.S. Dis-
trict Court for the District of Colorado found that the BLM’s decision 
to amend the RMP was arbitrary and capricious, and remanded the 
matter back to the agency.11 The court held that a significant defect in 
the agency’s Environmental Impact Statement (“EIS”) was a failure to 
                                                                                                                      
3 See Colorado Wildlife Federation, Northwest Colorado’s Wildlife Habitat 
Today: Are We Losing Our Heritage? 2 (2009), http://coloradowildlife.org/ui/images/ 
public/uploads/AreWeLosingOurWildlifeHeritageReport123009sm.pdf. 
4 Id.; see U.S. Bureau Of Land Mgmt., Roan Plateau Resource Management Plan 
Amendment: Facts And Figures [hereinafter Facts and Figures], http://www.blm.gov/ 
pgdata/etc/medialib/blm/co/programs/land_use_planning/rmp/roan_plateau/documents. 
Par.15350.File.dat/AtAGlance.pdf (last visited May 12, 2013) [hereinafter Facts and Fig-
ures]. 
5 See Facts and Figures, supra note 4. 
6 U.S. Bureau Of Land Mgmt., Roan Plateau Planning Area Resource Management 
Plan Amendment & Environmental Impact Statement 3–4 (2006), available at http:// 
www.blm.gov/pgdata/etc/medialib/blm/co/programs/land_use_planning/rmp/roan_plateau/ 
documents/final_eis.Par.67688.File.dat/Volume_I.pdf; Org. of the Petroleum Exporting 
Countries, Annual Statistical Bulletin 2010/2011 EDITION 27 (2011), available at http:// 
www.opec.org/opec_web/static_files_project/media/downloads/publications/ASB2010_20 
11.pdf. 
7 Colo. Envtl. Coal., 875 F. Supp. 2d at 1242. 
8 See id. at 1240; 10 U.S.C. § 7439(b)(1) (2006). 
9 Colo. Envtl. Coal., 875 F. Supp. 2d at 1241. 
10 Id. 
11 Id. at 1256. 
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address the potential effects of the new RMP on ozone levels.12 When 
remanding, however, the court offered no instructions for the agency 
in curing the EIS.13 Problematically, courts in the Tenth Circuit, includ-
ing the district court in this case, do not have a basis in case law for im-
posing stringent requirements on agencies when remanding.14 Prece-
dent in the nearby Ninth Circuit allows district courts to issue broad 
guidelines or more stringent requirements on remand.15 This Com-
ment argues that the Ninth Circuit’s application of the National Envi-
ronmental Policy Act (“NEPA”) better promotes the statute’s underly-
ing policies of public awareness and informed decisionmaking without 
imposing excessive burdens on government agencies.16 
I. Facts and Procedural History 
 The Roan Plateau Planning Area (“Planning Area”) spans more 
than one-hundred-and-twenty-thousand acres of northwestern Colo-
rado.17 The federal government owns approximately fifty-eight percent 
of the Planning Area, which the BLM manages.18 Steep cliffs separate 
the Planning Area into two distinct zones.19 The upper portion of the 
Planning Area, commonly referred to as the “Roan,” is predominantly 
untainted, moist montane and sub-alpine habitat that has been shaped 
into distinct drainage basins by various creeks.20 The lower portion of 
the Planning Area is slightly larger and is a comparatively arid, semi-
desert habitat.21 
 Historically, the Department of Energy (“DOE”) kept the Planning 
Area as a strategic petroleum and oil shale reserve for use in times of 
war or national emergency.22 The DOE referred to the upper portion 
of the Planning Area as Naval Petroleum and Oil Shale Reserve 
                                                                                                                      
12 Id. at 1258–59. 
13 Id. at 1259 n.23. 
14 See infra notes 53–57 and accompanying text. 
15 See Neighbors of Cuddy Mountain v. U.S. Forest Serv., 137 F.3d 1372, 1379 (9th Cir. 
1998). 
16 See infra notes 110–125 and accompanying text. 
17 Colo. Envtl. Coal., 875 F. Supp. at 1239. 
18 Id. 
19 Id. 
20 Id. Mountain montane habitats are characterized by rocky cliffs and steep slopes above 
the natural tree-line. Tayside Biodiversity Partnership, Montane 1, available at http:// 
www.angus.gov.uk/biodiversity/pdf/Section%202/Upland/U1.pdf. Such habitats are bio-
logically diverse, and because of the geological features of montane areas, are often undis-
turbed landscapes. Id. 
21 Colo. Envtl. Coal., 875 F. Supp. 2d at 1239. 
22 Id. at 1239–40. 
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(“NOSR”) 1, and the lower portion NOSR 3.23 In the 1980s, the DOE 
feared that private developers on adjacent lands were draining the oil 
reserves beneath NOSRs 1 and 3.24 As a result, the DOE authorized 
drilling on NOSR 3, producing a large amount of gas through 1996.25 
 By 1997, Congress and the DOE agreed that NOSRs 1 and 3 no 
longer served a strategic purpose.26 Congress transferred jurisdiction 
over the Planning Area from the DOE to the BLM and ordered that (1) 
the BLM enter into leases with private entities for energy exploration 
and development; and (2) the BLM manage the Planning Area in ac-
cordance with the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976 
and other laws applicable to public lands.27 
 In 2000, the BLM announced its intention to amend the control-
ling RMP to comply with the directives of Congress and facilitate di-
verse use of the Planning Area.28 By 2002, the BLM outlined six alter-
natives for consideration, and four of the alternatives would later 
become particularly relevant during judicial review.29 Alternative A was 
a statutorily mandated “no action” alternative that would leave ap-
proximately sixty percent of the Planning Area closed to oil and gas 
development.30 Alternative B would have made slightly more than half 
of the Planning Area available while providing increased environmental 
protection for certain areas with “exceptional wilderness or wildlife 
characteristics.”31 Alternative C was the BLM’s “preferred alternative” 
and would make the entire Planning Area available for oil and gas leas-
ing.32 The BLM removed Alternative F from consideration because it 
was nearly identical to Alternative A with the exception of a “Special 
Recreation Management Area” that would have been contingent upon 
the selection of Alternative A’s no leasing component.33 
                                                                                                                      
23 Id. 
24 Id. at 1240. 
25 Id. 
26 Id. 
27 10 U.S.C. § 7439(a)–(c) (2006); Colo. Envtl. Coal., 875 F. Supp. 2d at 1240. 
28 Colo. Envtl. Coal., 875 F. Supp. 2d at 1240. 
29 Id. 
30 Bureau of Land Mgmt., Resource Management Plan Amendment And Environ-
mental Impact Statement Draft 2–6 (2004), available at http://www.blm.gov/pgdata/ 
etc/medialib/blm/co/programs/land_use_planning/rmp/roan_plateau/documents/draft 
_eis.Par.94130.File.dat/Chapter_2_Alternatives.pdf (last visited May 5, 2013). 
31 Id. at 2–8. 
32 Id. at 2–10. 
33 Colo. Envtl. Coal., 875 F. Supp. 2d at 1239. The “Special Recreation Management Ar-
ea” would permit some forms of non-motorized recreational use while maintaining the 
natural features of the landscape. Id. at 1241. 
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 Subsequent to the BLM’s decision to discard Alternative F, several 
interested groups proposed the “Community Alternative.”34 This alter-
native provided a unique combination of full resource exploitation and 
preservation of the Planning Area’s unspoiled landscape.35 Under this 
plan, developers would position wells only along the perimeter of the 
Planning Area and would use directional drilling to extract oil and gas 
from beneath the entire surface.36 The BLM declined to consider the 
Community Alternative.37 The agency limited its explanation to a 
statement that the draft RMP and EIS had not developed and analyzed 
the Community Alternative.38 The five alternatives that the draft RMP 
and EIS analyzed already incorporated many of the basic components 
of the Community Alternative.39 The proposed RMP also reflected sev-
eral of these same components.40 
 The BLM officially adopted a variation of Alternative C in June 
2007, and the Colorado Environmental Coalition subsequently filed a 
complaint in the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado.41 In 
considering the alternatives, the court in Colorado Environmental Coali-
tion v. Salazar held that the BLM was justified in refusing to consider 
Alternative F, but that the agency’s failure to consider the Community 
Alternative was arbitrary and capricious.42 Regarding cumulative im-
pact analyses, the court held that the BLM took a “hard look” at the 
effects of the project on deer and elk but did not properly consider 
cumulative air quality impacts and ozone emissions.43 
                                                                                                                     
II. Legal Background 
 Under the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), courts have the 
authority to hold unlawful and set aside agency actions that are “arbi-
 
34 Letter from Rock the Earth to Greg Goodenow, Roan Plateau RMPA/DEIS Com-
ment Team (Apr. 15, 2005) (on file with author). 
35 Colo. Envtl. Coal., 875 F. Supp. 2d at 1249. 
36 Id. at 1242. Directional drilling utilizes special drilling equipment that allows develop-
ers to extract oil and gas from formations that are not directly beneath the surface well pad. 
Directional Drilling, Earthworks, http://www.earthworksaction.org/issues/detail/direction- 
al_drilling (last visited Apr. 22, 2013). Therefore, oil and gas bearing formations under the 
center of the Planning Area could be accessed by well pads that are stationed along the pe-
rimeter of the Planning Area, leaving the majority of the landscape’s surface unchanged. Id. 
37 Colo. Envtl. Coal., 875 F. Supp. 2d at 1242. 
38 Id. 
39 Id. at 1242–43. 
40 Id. 
41 Id. at 1243. 
42 Id. at 1248–50. 
43 Colo. Envtl. Coal., 875 F. Supp. 2d at 1253–59. 
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trary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance 
with law.”44 A court may only uphold an agency’s decision “on the basis 
articulated by the agency itself.”45 Any proffered post hoc rationalizations 
of agency action or inaction are insufficient to demonstrate proper 
procedure.46 To avoid a finding that agency action is arbitrary and ca-
pricious, the agency’s justifications for its decision must appear in the 
administrative record itself.47 
 In recognition of humanity’s significant effect on the quality of the 
environment, the National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”) reflects 
Congress’s intent to promote the general welfare by facilitating coexis-
tence between nature and humans while giving due consideration to 
the future social and economic needs of the United States.48 NEPA dic-
tates that all federal agencies create an Environmental Impact State-
ment (“EIS”) before undertaking any proposed major federal action 
that will significantly affect the environment.49 An EIS must detail (1) 
the environmental impact of the proposed action; (2) unavoidable ad-
verse environmental effects of the action; (3) alternatives to the pro-
posed action; (4) the relationship between short-term use of the envi-
ronment and long-term productivity; and (5) any irreversible or 
irretrievable commitment of resources associated with the proposed 
action.50 In evaluating alternatives to the proposed action, the agency 
must take a “hard look” at environmental consequences that might flow 
from a particular action.51 The Council on Environmental Quality 
(“CEQ”) promulgates regulations to guide agency compliance with 
NEPA.52 Emphasizing that public scrutiny of proposed agency actions is 
essential to implementing NEPA, the CEQ regulations mandate that 
agencies release “high quality” information to the public before taking 
action that might significantly affect the environment.53 
 In 2006, in Ecology Center, Inc. v. U.S. Forest Service, the Court of Ap-
peals for the Tenth Circuit stated a general rule regarding NEPA’s hard 
                                                                                                                      
44 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(a) (2006). 
45 Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of the U.S. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 
50 (1983). 
46 See Licon v. Ledezma, 638 F.3d 1303, 1308 (10th Cir. 2011); Bar MK Ranches v. Yuet-
ter, 994 F.2d 735, 740 (10th Cir. 1993). 
47 See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n, 463 U.S. at 43. 
48 42 U.S.C. § 4331 (2006). 
49 Id. § 4332(C)(i)–(v). 
50 Id. 
51 Balt. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 462 U.S. 87, 97 (1983). 
52 40 C.F.R. § 1500.1(a) (2011). 
53 Id. § 1500.1(b). 
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look analysis and the production of hard data.54 In response to the 
Ecology Center’s contention that the United States Forest Service’s 
(“USFS”) EIS was inadequate because it lacked hard data, the court 
unequivocally stated that the production of hard data is not necessary 
to satisfy NEPA’s hard look requirement.55 To determine whether the 
USFS took the requisite hard look before allowing a logging project to 
begin, the court summarily recounted the procedures required under 
NEPA.56 The court concluded that “[b]ecause the Forest Service has 
conformed with NEPA’s procedural requirements, we will not second-
guess the wisdom of the ultimate decision.”57 
 In 2008, the Tenth Circuit reiterated in Citizens’ Committee to Save 
Our Canyons v. Krueger that NEPA’s hard look does not necessarily re-
quire the production of hard data.58 In this case, a citizens group ar-
gued that the USFS should develop a more detailed analysis of helicop-
ter noise patterns that would result from a helicopter skiing operation 
in a national forest.59 Rather than quantifying the potential effects of 
helicopter noise, the agency’s EIS identified several variables that would 
affect the experience of others in the forest.60 Variables that the USFS 
deemed relevant included the number of helicopters in operation, the 
proximity of the helicopters to other users of the forest, and an indi-
vidual’s idiosyncratic level of noise tolerance.61 The court held that 
“while more information could have been collected . . . the EIS pro-
vides a sufficient basis for making an informed decision, taking into 
account how noise impacts might vary by alternative.”62 Consistent with 
precedent, the Tenth Circuit refused to require the USFS to reduce the 
                                                                                                                      
54 451 F.3d 1183, 1190 (10th Cir. 2006), see 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C)(i)–(v) (2006). 
55 451 F.3d at 1190. Ecology Center argued that the USFS failed to provide sufficient 
data to demonstrate that a commercial logging project was compatible with the Dixie Na-
tional Forest Plan, which was designed to protect the habitat and population of old growth 
species. Id. at 1185–88. In Utah Envtl. Cong. v. Richardson, the Tenth Circuit again divorced 
NEPA’s hard look requirement from an analysis of hard data. See 483 F.3d 1127, 1140 (10th 
Cir. 2007). There, the court found that “the Forest Service took a hard look, analyzed a 
substantial amount of data, and simply reached a conclusion that UEC thinks is incorrect.” 
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). This language implies that analyzing hard data is 
an additional step above and beyond taking the hard look required under NEPA. See id. 
56 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C)(i)–(v); Ecology Ctr., 451 F.3d at 1189; 40 C.F.R. § 1502.10 
(2011). 
57 Ecology Ctr., 451 F.3d at 1190 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
58 513 F.3d 1169, 1179 (10th Cir. 2008); see 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C)(i)–(v). 
59 513 F.3d at 1179. 
60 Id. at 1181. 
61 Id. 
62 Id. at 1182. 
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amount of noise to a numeric value that was either acceptable or unac-
ceptable.63 
 One year later, in New Mexico ex rel. Richardson v. Bureau of Land 
Management, the Tenth Circuit found that the Bureau of Land Man-
agement (“BLM”) failed to satisfy NEPA’s hard look requirement and 
therefore set aside the agency’s decision as arbitrary.64 New Mexico had 
challenged the BLM’s finding that environmental impacts on the Salt 
Basin Aquifer would be “minimal.”65 The state feared that waste water 
from operational natural gas wells would re-enter the ground and even-
tually contaminate the aquifer.66 The court began its hard look analysis 
by considering whether the BLM examined relevant data before de-
termining that the possibility of aquifer contamination was minimal.67 
The court found that the record contained no data supporting the 
BLM’s conclusion.68 Data actually suggested a non-negligible risk of 
aquifer contamination, which compounded the lack of support for the 
BLM’s conclusion.69 The court held that although it does not rule on 
the correctness of evidence on the record, “where [the evidence] 
points uniformly in the opposite direction from the agency’s determi-
nation, we cannot defer to that determination.”70 
 The Tenth Circuit’s highly deferential analysis of agency decision-
making and unwavering refusal to require hard data has manifested 
itself in district court decisions such as Amigos Bravos v. U.S. Bureau of 
Land Management.71 In that 2011 case, the plaintiffs challenged a deci-
sion by the BLM to authorize the sale of oil and gas leases.72 Although 
the plaintiffs acknowledged that the BLM had discretion in choosing a 
specific methodology, they argued that the BLM’s EIS was inadequate 
because it failed to incorporate quantitative ozone modeling.73 Not-
withstanding the plaintiffs’ reliance on persuasive precedent from the 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, the district court refused to 
condition compliance with NEPA’s hard look requirement on the pro-
                                                                                                                      
63 Id.; see Ecology Ctr., 451 F.3d 1183, 1190 (10th Cir. 2006). 
64 565 F.3d 683, 715 (10th Cir. 2009); see 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C)(i)–(v) (2006). 
65 565 F.3d at 713. 
66 Id. at 714. 
67 Id. 
68 Id. 
69 Id. at 715. 
70 Richardson, 565 F.3d at 715. 
71 No. 6:09-cv-00037-RB-LFG, 2011 WL 7701433, at *34 (D.N.M. Aug. 3, 2011). 
72 Id. at *31. 
73 Id. at *32. 
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duction of hard data.74 The court held that the BLM had taken the 
requisite hard look because the agency engaged in modeling of ozone 
precursors, and the “EIS Cumulative Impacts Analysis . . . indicate[d] 
the project’s emissions may have a potentially significant impact on . . . 
ozone levels.”75 
 The general rule of the Ninth Circuit’s hard look jurisprudence 
stands in stark contrast to that of the Tenth Circuit.76 In 1998, in 
Neighbors of Cuddy Mountain v. U.S. Forest Service, the Ninth Circuit stated 
that to satisfy NEPA, when analyzing cumulative effects of proposed pro-
jects an agency must use “some quantified or detailed information.”77 
The USFS had issued an EIS that described the effects of future timber 
sales on old-growth habitat in strictly qualitative terms.78 In rejecting the 
EIS, the Ninth Circuit noted that the USFS “failed to even mention the 
number or percentage of trees meeting the definition of old growth that 
would be destroyed by the three other proposed timber sales in the . . . 
area.”79 The EIS’s only forward-looking reference to future timber sales 
in the area noted that proposed sales would affect additional old growth 
area.80 The Ninth Circuit supported its requirement of quantitative or 
detailed data by implicating the policies of informed agency decision-
making and informing the public of the issues before the agency.81 
 A decade later, in Center for Biological Diversity v. National Highway 
Traffic Safety Administration, the plaintiffs challenged the National 
Highway Traffic Safety Administration’s (“NHTSA”) final rule on cor-
porate average fuel economy (“CAFE”) standards as inconsistent with 
NEPA, and alleged that the agency failed to take a hard look at the 
rule’s greenhouse gas implications.82 The NHTSA reasoned that be-
cause the final rule would result in a decrease of carbon dioxide emis-
                                                                                                                      
74 Id. (noting that the court was not bound by the Ninth Circuit and further distin-
guishing the case as being in the context of a temporary restraining order); see 42 U.S.C. 
§ 4332(C)(i)–(v) (2006). 
75 Id. at *34 (emphasis added). 
76 Compare Neighbors of Cuddy Mountain v. U.S. Forest Serv., 137 F.3d 1372, 1379 (9th 
Cir. 1998) (suggesting hard data is required to comply with hard look), with Ecology Ctr., 
451 F.3d at 1190 (rejecting argument that hard look requires production of hard data). 
77 137 F.3d at 1379; see 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C)(i)–(v). 
78 See 137 F.3d at 1379. 
79 Id. 
80 Id. 
81 See id. (“Without such information, neither the courts nor the public, in reviewing 
the Forest Service’s decisions, can be assured that the Forest Service provided the hard 
look that it is required to provide.”). 
82 538 F.3d 1172, 1181 (9th Cir. 2008); Average Fuel Economy Standards for Light 
Trucks Model Years 2008–2011, 71 Fed. Reg. 17566 (Apr. 6, 2006). 
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sions relative to the existing CAFE standards, the action would have no 
significant impact on the environment and did not require an EIS.83 
The NHTSA based its position on an Environmental Assessment (“EA”) 
that the agency produced.84 The Ninth Circuit held that the NHTSA’s 
EA amounted to “vague and conclusory statements” that were uncor-
roborated by any data, and therefore the EA did not satisfy NEPA’s hard 
look requirement.85 In the court’s view, the NHTSA’s EA lacked any 
real explanation as to why the final rule would not have a significant 
effect on the environment.86 
 The Ninth Circuit recently recognized that quantitative data is not 
always available, and in 2012 found that the USFS had taken the requi-
site hard look despite describing a project’s impacts on tree mortality in 
strictly qualitative terms.87 The USFS’s qualitative description of envi-
ronmental impacts at issue in League of Wilderness Defenders—Blue Moun-
tain Biodiversity Project v. U.S. Forest Service did not preclude compliance 
with NEPA because the agency explained why it could not provide ob-
jective, quantitative data.88 The Ninth Circuit recognized that quantita-
tive data was not available in this case but, consistent with its own 
precedent, stated that a hard look must not improperly minimize nega-
tive side effects of a project’s adverse environmental impacts.89 The 
USFS’s conclusion that a bark beetle infestation within the Experimen-
tal Forest Thinning, Fuel Reduction, and Research Project would likely 
lead to “larger-than-normal patches of tree mortality” did not under-
state the project’s adverse environmental impacts, and the hard look 
requirement was satisfied.90 
III. Analysis 
 In Colorado Environmental Coalition v. Salazar, the U.S. District Court 
for the District of Colorado held that the Bureau of Land Management 
(“BLM”) did not violate the National Environmental Policy Act 
(“NEPA”) when the agency refused to consider Alternative F of the Re-
                                                                                                                      
83 538 F.3d at 1220. 
84 Id. An EA is not required to be as thorough as an EIS. See Cal. Trout v. Fed. Energy 
Regulatory Comm’n, 572 F.3d 1003, 1015–16 (9th Cir. 2009). 
85 Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 538 F.3d at 1223–24. 
86 See id. at 1225. 
87 League of Wilderness Defenders—Blue Mountains Biodiversity Project v. U.S. Forest 
Serv., 689 F.3d 1060, 1076 (9th Cir. 2012). 
88 Id. 
89 See id. at 1075–76. 
90 See id. at 1076. 
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source Management Plan (“RMP”) because the alternative significantly 
overlapped with other choices under consideration.91 The BLM’s fail-
ure to consider the Community Alternative, however, was inconsistent 
with NEPA’s requirement to consider all reasonable alternatives to the 
proposed agency action.92 The court held that under NEPA, the BLM 
was not justified in refusing to consider the Community Alternative be-
cause the alternative was sufficiently distinct from other choices under 
consideration, and the BLM’s explanation for its decision amounted to 
an impermissible post hoc rationalization.93 
 After evaluating the BLM’s consideration of an adequate range of 
alternatives, the court moved to its hard look analysis.94 First, the court 
held that the BLM’s decision to limit the scope of its project analysis to a 
twenty-year timeframe did not violate NEPA.95 An e-mail from a BLM 
staff member addressed to several colleagues described any forecasting 
beyond twenty years as highly speculative, and this e-mail satisfied 
NEPA’s requirements by “the barest of margins.”96 Furthermore, the 
court was satisfied that the BLM took a hard look at the potential effects 
of oil and gas development on elk and mule deer.97 The court acknowl-
edged that the BLM did not consider the potential effects of increasing 
private oil development on private lands and how such development 
might affect migration patterns outside of the Planning Area, but the 
court found that such effects were outside the scope of the Environ-
mental Impact Statement (“EIS”) because they were not associated with 
the project.98 
 The court then held that the BLM failed to take the requisite hard 
look at the cumulative impacts of the project on the air quality effects 
of the amended RMP.99 The EIS failed to assess the effects of the pro-
ject in conjunction with the effects of private oil and gas development 
that would occur outside of the Planning Area.100 Although the court 
recognized that the effects of private development outside of the Plan-
ning Area might be difficult to analyze, the BLM had analyzed the ef-
                                                                                                                      
91 875 F. Supp. 2d 1233, 1248 (D. Colo. 2012); see 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C)(i)–(v) (2006). 
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fects of private development within the Planning Area.101 The court 
held that the BLM failed to take a hard look at the RMP because the 
BLM neglected to articulate why the methodology used to analyze pri-
vate development within the Planning Area could not be extended to 
private lands outside of the Planning Area.102 
 Finally, the court considered the BLM’s treatment of air quality 
issues stemming from the project’s ozone emissions.103 The court held 
that because the EIS contained no evidence supporting the conclusion 
that the project would not lead to violations of the Clean Air Act’s 
(“CAA”) ambient air quality standards, NEPA’s hard look requirement 
was not satisfied.104 The court remanded the issue to the BLM but 
stated that the court “does not opine or intend to offer any particular 
direction as to how the BLM should proceed upon remand.”105 This 
unqualified deference on remand to the agency exemplifies the differ-
ence between the jurisprudence of the Ninth Circuit and the Tenth 
Circuit.106 
 In Neighbors of Cuddy Mountain v. U.S. Forest Service, the Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit stated its general rule that federal agen-
cies must provide some quantified or detailed information to satisfy 
NEPA’s hard look requirement.107 Conversely, the Tenth Circuit un-
equivocally rejected that premise in Ecology Center, Inc. v. U.S. Forest Ser-
vice.108 Therefore, as a jurisprudential matter, the district court in Colo-
rado Environmental Coalition was justified under Tenth Circuit precedent 
in giving the BLM such nebulous guidelines on remand.109 
 Considering the policies underlying NEPA as described in the 
Council on Environmental Quality’s (“CEQ”) enforcement guidance, 
the Ninth Circuit’s application of NEPA is preferable.110 Specifically, 
                                                                                                                      
101Id. Although factors in emissions such as the number of glycol dehydrators and 
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the Ninth Circuit’s jurisprudence, by initially requiring hard data, goes 
further in ensuring that the public is informed of the environmental 
impacts of proposed agency action.111 Moreover, although the Ninth 
Circuit imposes more stringent standards concerning NEPA require-
ments, the court’s approach contains enough flexibility to balance 
NEPA’s underlying policies with the interest in not placing unreason-
able demands on agencies.112 
                                                                                                                     
 The plaintiffs in Colorado Environmental Coalition argued that the 
record did not contain adequate support for the BLM’s conclusion that 
the selected RMP would not result in a violation of the CAA.113 The 
CAA’s National Ambient Air Quality Standards promulgate quantified 
restrictions on levels of atmospheric ozone.114 
 Even if the BLM’s conclusion regarding the CAA’s ozone standards 
were correct, assuming that there is no significance beyond merely 
complying with the standards would be fallacious.115 Indeed, the EPA 
regulations for the prevention of significant deterioration of air quality 
themselves contemplate meaning beyond formulaic compliance with 
the CAA’s standards.116 Conversely, the Tenth Circuit’s interpretation of 
NEPA permits qualitative descriptions that might fail to account for the 
degree to which an area will be above or below the CAA’s ozone stan-
dards.117 A district court under the Ninth Circuit, beginning from the 
premise that hard data is required to satisfy NEPA, would have been 
justified in demanding that the BLM on remand either produce hard 
data or explain why such data is unavailable.118 The Ninth Circuit’s ap-
proach to the hard look requirement better serves the interest in in-
forming the public of the adverse environmental impacts of proposed 
agency action.119 
 Although the Ninth Circuit imposes more stringent hard look re-
quirements than the Tenth Circuit, the Ninth Circuit will adjust its ap-
proach when hard data is unavailable.120 Where the exigencies of an 
 
111 See supra notes 107–110 and accompanying text. 
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analysis compel an agency to provide a description in qualitative terms, 
the Ninth Circuit will find the hard look requirement to be satisfied if 
the agency (1) provides a “reasonable justification” for why hard data is 
unavailable; and (2) does not improperly minimize the adverse envi-
ronmental effects of the agency action.121 If the district court in Colo-
rado Environmental Coalition had imposed a hard data requirement on 
the BLM on remand, the BLM probably would have cited difficulty in 
producing such data as a result of the speculative nature of private de-
velopment on adjacent parcels of land.122 Under the Ninth Circuit’s 
approach, if the BLM were to make such an argument, the agency 
would have to explain why the data is unavailable, and the agency’s 
qualitative analysis could not understate the adverse environmental im-
pacts of the problem.123 If the Roan Plateau Planning Area project 
would raise atmospheric ozone levels without violating the CAA, the 
BLM would have to describe that scenario to the best of its ability.124 
This would mitigate the problems inherent in attempting to foster pub-
lic awareness by providing qualitative descriptions of compliance with 
quantitative standards.125 
Conclusion 
 On remand, the BLM is unlikely to go beyond the requirements of 
the district court and produce hard data to support its conclusion that 
the agency’s decision will not lead to a violation of the CAA. The result 
will be an analysis of the project that largely fails to inform the public of 
the true environmental effects of oil and gas development on the Roan 
Plateau. An uninformed public is the logical outgrowth of a court that 
refuses to demand hard data to demonstrate compliance with NEPA’s 
hard look requirement. The Ninth Circuit’s approach to NEPA’s hard 
look requirement is preferable to that of the Tenth Circuit because 
without imposing draconian requirements on administrative agencies, 
it does more to further NEPA’s policy of promoting public awareness 
and informed decisionmaking. 
 
121 Id. at 1075–76. 
122 See Colo. Envtl. Coal., 875 F. Supp. 2d at 1255–56 (mentioning that the BLM made 
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124 See id. at 1075. 
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